We introduce strategic waiting in a global game setting. Players can wait in order to take a better informed decision. We allow for cohort e®ects, which naturally arise if the network externality in a given period depends on the mass of players who are actively using the technology at this point in time. Formally, cohort e®ects lead to intra-period network e®ects being greater than inter-period network e®ects. In the absence of cohort e®ects, our model has a unique rationalizable equilibrium. Cohort e®ects, however, can lead to multiple equilibria within the class of symmetric switching strategies. JEL-codes: C72, C73, D82, D83.
Introduction
In many economic situations, the optimal action of an economic agent is complementary to the actions undertaken by other agents. For example, a consumer's payo® from buying a computer software typically increases as the number of consumers who use this technology increases. One reason for this is a direct network e®ect. The amount of people with whom the consumer can exchange relevant data increases. Another is an indirect network e®ect. The more popular the software, the more likely complementary products are o®ered. Such indirect network e®ects are common. Consider a consumer deciding on whether or not to buy a video recorder (CD player or DVD player). As there are more users, more videos (CD's or DVD's) will become available to the consumer. Or, think of a consumer who decides to buy a durable consumption good such as a car. As more consumers buy this brand of car, more repair shops will have the know-how and spare parts to repair the car quickly. Complementarity of optimal actions is also a key ingredient of Diamond and Dybvig's (1983) famous bank-run model in which a player's payo® from withdrawing depends on the actions undertaken by the other players. Similarly, in Obstfeld's (1996) model of currency crises a speculative attack is only successful if launched by a su±ciently high number of traders. Models of situations in which the agents' optimal actions are complementary to each other are often plagued by multiple equilibria with self-full¯lling beliefs: If a player expects the other players to take the action (i.e withdraw in Diamond and Dybvig's model), then it's in her best interest to withdraw as well. If a player expects the other players not to withdraw, she wants to refrain from withdrawing. This multiplicity result is annoying from an economic-policy point of view. Without an adequate theory of equilibrium selection, one cannot use these theories to predict the stability of a¯nancial system or of a currency peg nor can one predict the market outcome in markets with network e®ects. How then does one judge, for example, whether costly policies to enhance the stability of the¯nancial system should be implemented?
For two-player coordination games, Carlsson and van Damme (1993) , henceforth CD, developed an equilibrium selection theory, which was adopted to (a speci¯c) coordination problem with a continuum of players by Morris and Shin (1998) . CD assume that the agents' payo®s depend on the action chosen by the other agent in the economy and some unknown economic fundamental summarized by the state of the world µ. Agents receive di®erent signals about µ; which generate beliefs about the state of the world and a hierarchy of higher order beliefs (beliefs about the other agent's beliefs, beliefs about the other agent's beliefs about his beliefs, etc...).
1 CD called this incomplete information game a global game and showed that if the potential type space is rich enough, the game has a unique equilibrium.
Thus, the global game framework enables researchers to base policy recommendations on theory that predicts behavior in coordination games (e.g the probability of a bank run or of a speculative currency attack). It has been used to model currency crises (Morris and Shin (1998) , Corsetti and al. (2000) , ...), bank runs (Goldstein and Pauzner (2000) , Rochet and Vives (2000) ,...) and car-dealer markets (DÄ onges and Heinemann (2000) ). All these papers are based on static models. In reality, however, many economic coordination problems are essentially dynamic. Players can always postpone their investment decisions (or their withdrawing decision) in order to make a more informed decision at a later point in time. What happens in a coordination game with incomplete information once we allow for strategic waiting? To better understand this question let us¯rst explain the logic underlying any global game.
Consider a continuum of players who have the opportunity to undertake a risky investment, whose return depends positively on the realization of a random variable and on the mass of investors. All players possess some noisy private information concerning the realization of the random variable. Players who received a \very high" signal always invest, since they believe that the state of the world is so good that investing is always pro¯table -independent of the actions undertaken by the other players. Consider now a player that possess a \high" but not a \very high" signal. If she expects no other player to invest, then she would rather refrain from investing. She knows, however, that all players with a very high signal invest. Given her signal, it is equally likely that the other players received a higher or lower signal than herself. Therefore, in equilibrium, she cannot expect that no other player invests. As her signal is \high," her knowledge that everyone with a very high signal invests is enough to induce her to invest as well. This will, in turn, convince other players possessing a signal a little less favorable then hers to also 1 Carlsson and van Damme's work is based on the insight developed in Rubinstein's (1989) famous electronic mail game, in which he illustrated that the risk-dominated equilibrium of the common knowledge game is selected as the unique equilibrium in the absence of common knowledge. That heterogeneity of agents can lead to a unique equilibrium in situations in which the agents actions are complementary to each other was shown earlier by Postlewaite and Vives (1987) in a bank-run model. invest, etc... . This process of iterative elimination of dominated strategies stops at the point where a player, who believes that everyone with a lower signal than herself does not invest, is indi®erent between investing and not investing. Similar, because it is a dominant strategy not to invest for players with \very low" signals, players with low signals refrain from investing. Iteratively eliminating players for whom it is a dominant strategy not to invest, there is a critical player who is indi®erent between investing and not investing if she believes that all players with a higher signal than herself invest. With a uniform prior, the two iterative processes stop at the same point and, hence, there is a unique equilibrium. This equilibrium is characterized by a critical treshold, below which no player invests and above which all players invest.
It is not clear, however, whether this line of reasoning can be extended to a dynamic setting. In a dynamic setting, we would expect the most \extreme" players (e.g. those players possessing a \very high" signal) to move¯rst. Thus, the period-two distribution of signals is a truncated one (and this is common knowledge). Given that the \very high" types have invested at time one, do the \high" types then still have a strong incentive to invest at time two, or do their investment incentives depend on their expectations (of the other players' actions at time two)? Furthermore, in many dynamic settings the bene¯t of moving early depends not only on the aggregate mass of investors but also on when other players invest. Consider, for example, a consumer buying a computer software early on. In the interim period in which late movers have not invested yet, this early mover is subject to a network e®ect depending on the mass of early movers only. Here, the intra-period network e®ects between early investors are greater than the inter-period network e®ects with late movers. We call this an early mover cohort e®ect. Similar, if the intra-period network e®ects between second-period investors are greater than the inter-period ones with¯rst-period investors, we say that there is a late mover cohort e®ect.
2 Cohort e®ects yield an additional coordination aspect: when to invest. To understand why cohort e®ects may matter, suppose that the inter-period network e®ects are zero. Then one would expect an equilibrium to exist in which all players invest in the¯rst period and one in which all players invest in the second period. That is, one would expect multiple equilibria to exist. This raises the question:
Under what conditions do multiple equilibria exist with less extreme cohort e®ects?
To investigate the dynamic extension, we analyze a set-up identical to the one we described above, with the exception that players can invest in either of two periods. If a player waits, she gets a more informative signal (concerning the realization of the random variable) at the cost of foregone pro¯ts. Our model is simple in the sense that we assume a uniform distribution of period-one signals. Moreover, we assume that each player at time two can either receive good or bad news and that the second-period signal constitutes a su±cient statistic for a player's beliefs about the random variable. This set of assumptions highly simplify the computation of our equilibrium strategies and permit us to get closed-form solutions. This enables us to investigate the role of cohort e®ects. We characterize for which parameter values our model has multiple equilibria in symmetric switching strategies and show that for some underlying economic interpretations our model exhibits multiple equilibria while for others it does not. In particular, in the absence of cohort e®ects, our model has a unique equilibrium in rationalizable strategies. This is not the¯rst paper to introduce dynamic elements in a global game. Morris and Shin (1999) and Chamley (1999) studied a dynamic global game in which the state of the world evolves stochastically through time. In each period all players face a new investment opportunity and players observe a statistic correlated with past realizations of the state of the world. In those models players have no incentives to wait and act later on the basis of more information. Under some additional assumptions, the authors show that each period can be analyzed as a static global game. Thus, their models have a unique equilibrium.
3
To the best of our knowledge, only Dasgupta (2001) introduced elements of strategic waiting in a global game. Players can invest in two periods. If a player delays, she observes a noisy signal about the past economic activity (at the cost of foregone pro¯ts). Dasgupta shows that his game, under some additional assumptions on the prior distribution and the signalling technology, is characterized by a unique equilibrium in the class of switching strategies. The main di®erence between our paper and Dasgupta (2001) is that we investigate cohort e®ects, which are not present in his model in which payo®s depend only on the aggregate number of investors. Another di®erence is that in his model one wants to delay to engage in social learning, while in our model a player delays to obtain a more precise signal.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce our formal model. In section 3, we relate the parameters of our model to di®erent economic environments. In section 4, we analyze the model and characterize the set of parameter values for which it has multiple equilibria. Final comments are summarized in the¯fth and¯nal section. Appendix 1 derives the number of investors as function of the realized fundamental and a given strategy pro¯le. Some more technical proofs are relegated to Appendices 2, 3, and 4. egy is a best response at every information set given (i) his beliefs about the state of the world, and given (ii) the equilibrium behavior of all other agents.
Economic Interpretations
In this section, we show that the payo® structure of our model accommodates a wide variety of more speci¯c models.
Fixed Horizon Technology Adoption Problem (= FHTAP). Suppose players can invest in a new technology with an unknown quality. This technology exhibits positive network e®ects and becomes obsolete in period T + 1: For simplicity, players are only allowed to invest in period 1 or period 2 and have a common discount factor ±. Call a player who invested at time one (two) an (a) early (late) adopter. When investing, players need to pay a setup cost s¸0: The (net of any per-period cost) return of the investment in period t (t = 1; :::; T ); is given by v i t =μ + m t ; where m t denotes the mass of players who invest in period t or who have invested earlier. Assume, for the sake of simplicity, that T = 2. In this case the payo® of a player investing in period 1 is given by
and of a player investing in period 2 is given by
Setting µ =μ ¡ s (1+±) + 1 and using the following utility transformation
shows that this economic model is a special case of our model in which ® = ¿ = ± 1+± < 1;°= 1; and ¢ = ± 1+± s:
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Note that at time one the early adopters do not enjoy any network bene¯ts from the late adopters. Therefore early adopters care more about the mass of players who bought the technology at time one than about the mass of players who bought it at time two (which explains why in this case ® < 1). The FHTAP model can be interpreted as a stylized model of the credit card industry. The more popular a credit card becomes, the more widespread its acceptance will be. Early adopters of a credit card are therefore hampered by its small installed base in the sense that they will¯nd few shops willing to accept it. On the other hand, late movers care as much about the mass of early as about the mass of late adopters (which explains why in this case°= 1).
6 Whenever an early (late) adopter exhibits a stronger preference for her fellow adopters to invest early (late), we say that our model exhibits a cohort e®ect for the early (late) adopters.
Adopting a Technology with a Fixed Lifespan (=ATFL). Rather than assuming that the technology becomes obsolete at time T + 1, suppose the technology, once bought, can be used for T periods. For the sake of simplicity, assume that T = 2 (i.e. in this case an early adopter uses her technology at times one and two, while a late adopter uses it at times two and three). If the setup remains otherwise unchanged, one can use a similar procedure as above to show that this is a special case of our model in which ¿ = ±; ® = ±°<°= 1 1+± < 1; and ¢ = 0.
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To illustrate this interpretation, consider the following example: Assume everyone has the opportunity to buy a video player. The more people who buy a video player, the higher the availability of video movies, video rental stores, etc. A video player can only be used for two periods. Everyone knows that at time 3 the DVD player will be introduced in our economy. As DVD technology is superior to video technology, from time 3 on, no one wants to buy a new video player anymore. However, people only switch to the superior DVD technology once their video player becomes \too old" (i.e. early adopters switch to the superior technology at time three, while late adopters switch to the new technology at time four). In this set-up for the same reason as the one explained in our earlier interpretation, our model exhibits a cohort e®ect for the early adopters. However, in this case late adopters know that the installed base will become smaller at time three due to the early adopters' switching to the new technology. Therefore, the ATFL model also exhibits a cohort e®ect for late adopters.
Technology Adoption Problem with Partially Compatible Technologies (=TAPPCT).
Consider the same setup as in the Fixed Horizon Technology Adoption Problem (with T = 2) except for the following two changes. First, assume that the early adopters get the following per-period payo®s: v i 11 =μ + n 1 and v i 21 =μ + n 1 +®n 2 (where v i t1 denotes the payo® received by player i at time t (t = 1; 2) given that she adopted the new technology at time one and where® 2 [0; 1)). Second, assume late adopters get the following second-period payo®: v i 22 =μ +°n 1 + n 2 (wherẽ°2 [0; 1)). In this case the present value of adopting early equals
while a late adopter receives
Applying the same utility transformation to these payo®s as the one explained in our FHTAP-interpretation, one can check that this interpretation is a special case of our model in which ® =® For example, one can think of our players as consumers who choose whether or not to buy a computer. Early adopters buy a computer equipped with Windows 3.11. Between time one and time two, the seller introduces a superior computer equipped with Windows 95. As both operating systems are di®erent, a late adopter can not always be helped by an early adopter whenever she faces a problem (and vice versa). Therefore, in this example, there is a cohort e®ect for both the early and the late adopters.
Pledging to Invest with Early Mover Advantage (=PIEMA). Suppose there are two periods in which players can commit to invest into a project prior to the time in which the project will take place. For example,¯rms may commit to buy some land in a soon-to-be developed industrial zone (or individuals may commit to become a member of some club or lobbying organization). In the¯rst period, the land is sold at a lower price than in the second period (or there is a reduced membership rate). The more players invest in either period, the better the infrastructure provided (or the more exciting it will be to visit the club or the more in°uential will the lobbying organization be). In period 3, all players that committed to invest pay the amount due and start getting the bene¯t from the planned activity. This can be captured by a model in which ® =°= ¿ = 1 and ¢ > 0: This example is thus void of any cohort e®ects.
Analysis of Strategic Waiting
In this section, we¯rst characterize the equilibria within the class of symmetric switching strategies. Our characterization shows that cohort e®ects can lead to multiple equilibria. We then prove that in the absence of cohort e®ects, there exists an essentially unique equilibrium in rationalizable strategies. We furthermore discuss under what parameter conditions our model has a unique equilibrium in class of symmetric switching strategies.
To solve the dynamic game, we show that every symmetric equilibrium in switching strategies can be found by analyzing a system of equations. We start with some useful de¯nitions. Let
is the expected payo® of a player who invests in the second period after getting a signal s i 2 ; expecting that all other players play the strategy k: Similar, we de¯ne
W (s i 1 ; k) the gain of waiting for a player i with a signal s i 1 who believes that all other players play k. If player i postpones her investment decision, then with probability 1/2 she will get \bad news," i.e. she will learn that at time one she was to optimistic because ² i 1 = +²: With probability 1/2, however, she will receive \good news" in the sense that she will learn that ² i 1 = ¡²: Equation (2) states that player i's gain of waiting equals her expected second-period payo® given that she will take an optimal second-period investment decision (i.e. not invest at time two if and only if her gain of investing is negative). For brevity, de¯ne
Trivially, it is optimal to invest in the¯rst period for a player with a signal s A necessary condition for a strategy pro¯le k¤ in which k ¤ t < 1 for t+1; 2 to be an equilibrium (strategy pro¯le) in symmetric switching strategies is that it satis¯es the following two equations:
Equation (4), which can be rewritten as
states that a player possessing a¯rst-period signal s i 1 = k ¤ 1 must be indi®erent between investing and waiting. Equation (5) (4) must be replaced by the condition g(s
That is it must be optimal to refrain from investing for all¯rst period signals. Similar, in case s i 2 = 1; condition (5) must be replaced by the condition h(k
2 ), then any strategy pro¯le k ¤ satisfying (4) and (5) is clearly an equilibrium strategy pro¯le. However, note that in general h(¢) can be a function of E(n 2 j ¢): In some symmetric switching equilibria, players refrain from investing for su±ciently low signals and all players invest immediately in the¯rst period for su±ciently high signals. For intermediate signals, however, players wait and invest in the second period when receiving good news. In such a candidate equilibrium, h(¢) need not be monotone in s i 2 as E(n 2 j ¢) is not. When characterizing the set of symmetric switching equilibria, we¯rst look for candidate equilibria that solve equations (4) and (5) and then carefully verify that these candidate equilibria are indeed equilibria. To economize on notation, we will from now on denote equilibrium strategy pro¯les (and candidate equilibria) by k rather than k ¤ :
We refer to an equilibrium k in which no player invests in the second period as an immediate investment equilibrium. Formally, k is an immediate investment equilibrium if and only if k 2¸k1 + ²:
Proposition 1 There exists an immediate investment equilibrium if and only if ¢¸¡
In an immediate investment equilibrium
Proof: In an immediate investment equilibrium no player invests in the second period. Hence, h(s
As shown in Appendix 1, E(n 1 js i 2 ; k) is weakly increasing, and thus h(s i 2 ; k) is strictly increasing in an immediate investment equilibrium. By de¯nition, we look for an equilibrium in which h(s i 2 = k 1 + ²; k) · 0: Hence, the gain of waiting must be equal to zero. Therefore, k 1 must be set such that a player who possesses a signal s i 1 = k 1 is indi®erent between investing and not investing. Hence k 1 solves the following equation
Using Appendix 1 and the fact that
it is easy to verify that E(n 1 j s
: Using this fact to rewrite the condition that no player has an incentive to invest in the second period, i.e. that h(s
: Substituting this into equation (6) and rewriting yields ¢¸¡
which is a necessary condition for an immediate investment equilibrium to exist. Because we already established that h(s i 2 ; k) is strictly increasing, it su±ces to show that g(¢) is (weakly) increasing to show that an immediate investment equilibrium exists whenever ¢¸¡
First, observe that for all s
which is strictly increasing in s
Using Lemma (3), one can rewrite this equation as 
Rewriting this equation using Lemma (3) yields
The parameter condition under which an immediate investment equilibrium exists is intuitive. As the payo® reduction for late movers ¢ increases, players have an incentive to move early and thus an immediate investment equilibrium is more likely to exist. As°decreases, a player who deviates in order to invest late enjoys a smaller (inter-period) network e®ect, which makes deviating less attractive. Hence, as°decreases, an immediate investment equilibrium is more likely to exists. To understand why an increase in ² makes it harder to sustain an immediate investment equilibrium, consider a player with a signal s i 1 = 1=2: This player is uncertain about whether the fundamental µ is high enough to make his investment pro¯table. As ² increases, more uncertainty about µ is resolved between period one and two, which makes it more desirable to wait in order to receive more information.
To further understand the role of ²; it is useful to note that the expected network bene¯t for a player with a signal s i 1 is 1/2 in an immediate investment equilibrium. Formally, using Appendix 1 and the fact that
: Intuitively, player i knows that all players possessing a signal higher (lower) than hers invest (do not invest) at time one. Player i asks herself the question: What is the mass of players who received a¯rst-period signal greater than k 1 ? Player i knows that µ lies in a 2² neighborhood of s . Therefore E(n 1 js i 1 = k 1 ; (k 1 ; 1)) = 1=2. Stated di®erently, player i always believes to lie in the center of the world. She always expects half of the population to possess a signal strictly higher than hers, with the other half possessing a signal strictly lower than hers. Now, for simplicity, suppose that there is no late mover cohort e®ect°= 0 and that ¢ = 0: Then an immediate investment equilibrium does not exist whenever ² > 1=2: The intuition for this result is as follows: In an immediate investment equilibrium a player with a signal s i 1 = k 1 is indi®erent between investing and not investing, which is the action she will take if she decides to wait. So her expected payo® must be zero. Furthermore, as discussed above he expects half of the population to get a better signal than herself. So her expected gain from the network e®ect is 1=2: But if ² > 1=2; this player could wait, forfeit the expected network e®ect and only invest if she learns that she was to pessimistic. In this case her expected payo® when getting good news changes by ² ¡ 1=2; while her expected payo® when getting bad news remains zero. So if ² > 1=2 this is a pro¯table deviation and an immediate investment equilibrium cannot exist.
We refer to an equilibrium (1; k 2 ) in which no player invests in the¯rst period as a complete waiting equilibrium. (1 ¡ ®)g: In a complete waiting equilibrium k 2 = 1 2 + ¢:
Proof: Using the fact that no player invests in the¯rst period,
Observe that n 2 (s i 2 ; µ) is weakly increasing in µ; because as µ increases, (weakly) more players receive a signal s i 2¸k 2 : Hence,
It is easy to check that E(n 2 j s 
Rewriting, yields g(s
Fix any values of ®; ¢; ¿: If ¿ < 1; there exists a su±ciently high s i 1 such that g(s i 1 ; k) > 0; ruling out the existence of a complete waiting equilibrium in this case. Hence, a necessary condition for a complete waiting equilibrium is that ¿ = 1: From now on, let ¿ = 1: If s i 1 · k 2 ¡ ²; it is optimal for player i not to invest in the second period, independent of whether he gets good or bad news. Thus, in this case g(s
Since, by the same reasoning as above, E(n 2 j s 
; this simpli¯es to
; then it is optimal to invest in the second period if and only if player i receives good news. Thus, in this case
Using Leibnitz's rule,
where the¯rst inequality follows from the facts that n 2 (µ; k) is weakly increasing and lies between 0 and 1, and the second inequality follows from ® · 1: Hence g(s
(1 ¡ ®); we conclude that g(s (1 ¡ ®): If s i 1¸k 2 + ²; then it is optimal for player i to invest in the second period independent of whether he receives good news or bad news. Therefore, in this case g(s (1 ¡ ®): Q.E.D.
A complete waiting equilibrium exists only if the cost of waiting are not to high. If ¿ < 1 players discount the payo®s of investing in the second period as their bene¯ts from investing are delayed. In this case, as the fundamental µ increases without bound, the forgone¯rst-period bene¯t grows without bound. In other words, if ¿ < 1; then it is a dominant strategy to invest in the¯rst period for su±ciently high signals. Thus a complete waiting equilibrium cannot exist in this case. If ¿ = 1 then the cost of delay are measured by ¢: If ¢ is to large, it is intuitive that no complete waiting equilibrium exists. Indeed, as ¢ increases two complications may arise. First, players with a signal s i 1 < 1=2 + ¢ ¡ ²; who are meant to abstain from investing in an immediate investment equilibrium, may prefer to invest in thē rst period rather than not investing at all. For a given ¢ this problem is more likely to arise if ² decreases, because in that case some of these players expect the state of the world to be better. Also this problem is more likely to arise as the inter-period network e®ect ® increases and these players expect to bene¯t more from the second period investment activity. Second, players may prefer to invest immediately rather than to wait and invest in the second period. This problem is more likely to occur as the inter-period network e®ect ® increase and early movers bene¯t more from the late investment activity. Depending on the parameters, either problem may arise¯rst.
If there is no early mover cohort e®ect (® = 1), then a complete waiting equilibrium cannot exist (unless there are no waiting costs at all, i.e. ¿ = 1 and ¢ = 0). The reason is that in this case a player with a very high¯rst period signal foresees that all players will invest. But if there are no cohort e®ects, he prefers to invest immediately and save the waiting cost. If there are cohort e®ects, however, he prefers to wait if the waiting cost are less than the reduction in the network e®ect from moving early. It is easy to check that if cohort e®ects are su±ciently strong, then there exist parameter values for which an immediate investment and a complete waiting equilibrium coexist. In the absence of cohort e®ects, this cannot be the case (except if there are no waiting costs at all). This result already hints at the main message of our paper: Cohort e®ects can give rise to multiple equilibria. The following analysis shows that this insight generalizes to the case where it is a dominant strategy for players with a very high¯rst period signal to invest immediately (i.e. ¿ < 1).
We will refer to an equilibrium in which players with high signals invest immediately and player with intermediate signals wait and invest later when receiving good news (but not when receiving bad news) as an informative waiting equilibrium. Formally, an informative waiting equilibrium is an equilibrium in which
For brevity, let x´4² +°and let
We are ready to characterize when an informative waiting equilibrium exists.
Proposition 3 There exists an informative waiting equilibrium (k 11 ; k 21 ) if the following three conditions are satis¯ed:
In this informative waiting equilibrium
Furthermore, there exists an informative waiting equilibrium (k 12 ; k 22 ) if the following three conditions are satis¯ed:
Conversely, there exists no other informative waiting equilibrium.
Proof: Rewriting (4) and (5) using the fact that k 1 ¡ ² < k 2 < k 1 + ² in an informative waiting equilibrium gives
Thus, (4) and (5) are a pair of quadratic equations, which is equivalent to a fourth order polynomial. Hence, there exists a routine procedure to solve this system of equations. Using mathematica to solve this system of equations shows that there are only two pair of roots (k 11 ; k 21 ) and (k 21 ; k 22 ): Rewriting, gives the expressions given in the proposition above. Because (4) and (5) are necessary conditions for an equilibrium, all informative waiting equilibria ar either of the form (k 11 ; k 21 ) or (k 21 ; k 22 ): Observe that all roots are real if and only if D¸0: This requires that
Rewriting gives condition (a).
(k 11 ; k 21 ) is a valid solution only if k 11 ¡ ² < k 21 < k 11 + ²; because otherwise the functional form of (4) and (5) would di®er from the one used above. That is, we require that (i) ¡² < k 11 ¡ k 21 and that (ii) k 11 ¡ k 21 < ²: Using the fact that
condition (i) holds if and only if
Note that this inequality is satis¯ed if either
Rewriting gives condition (b).
Squaring this inequality on both sides and rewriting yields
which is equivalent to condition (c) in the proposition. Hence, conditions (a), (b), and (c) are necessary conditions for (k 11 ; k 21 ) to characterize an equilibrium.
Similar, (k 12 ; k 22 ) is a valid solution only if both (i) ¡² < k 12 ¡k 22 and (ii) k 12 ¡k 22 < ² hold. Using the fact that
which is condition (d) in the proposition, and that D < [(2¡®)¡(2¡¿ )x]
2 ; which is equivalent to condition (e) in the proposition. We conclude that conditions (a), (d) and (e) are necessary conditions for (k 12 ; k 22 ) to characterize an equilibrium. (Note also that k 12 ¡k 22 = ²[1¡®¡(2¡¿ )x¡ p D] < ²:) Hence, we have established that no other informative waiting equilibrium than the ones characterized in the proposition exist. To show that (k 11 ; k 21 ) and (k 12 ; k 22 ) are indeed equilibria under the above conditions, we are left to verify that (i) h(s (4) in Appendix 2, and condition (iii) follows from Lemmas (7),(9), and (11) to (14). Q.E.D.
To understand under what conditions an informative investment equilibrium exists, suppose¯rst that (2 ¡ ®) < (2 ¡ ¿ )x; as is the case in the absence of cohort e®ects. Then, since condition (d) is violated, the (k 12 ; k 22 ) equilibrium does not exist. Next, observe that in this case conditions (a) and (b) are satis¯ed whenever ¢ is to low to sustain an immediate investment equilibrium, i.e. when waiting to act on more information is pro¯table. The role of condition (c) is to ensure that the relevant decision for a player with signal s i 1 = k 1 is whether to wait for good news or whether to invest immediately. If it is violated, the player would prefer to invest in the second period also when getting bad news (which explains why condition (c) gives a lower bound on ¢). Thus condition (c) can only be binding in the presence of cohort e®ects. If cohort e®ects are absent, the only reason to wait is to collect information in order to make a better informed decision. So if a player would prefer to invest when getting bad news, he could invest immediately and save the waiting costs. If cohort e®ects are present, however, one may want to wait in order to bene¯t from a higher network e®ect. Note that this requires that°i s su±ciently greater than ®; that is late movers must enjoy a higher intra-period network e®ect than early movers. The intuition for this is that a player with signal s i 1 = k 1 expects half of the population to invest in the¯rst period. So he can expect at most half of the population to invest late. Therefore, he can only expect to gain a larger network e®ect by moving late if the inter-period network e®ect for late movers°is greater than its¯rst period counterpart ®:
We are left to consider the case in which (2 ¡ ®) > (2 ¡ ¿ )x: Trivially, this implies that conditions (b) and (d) 
there exist values of ¢ for which our model has multiple equilibria as long as ¢ a¸0 : To better understand when (2 ¡ ®) > (2 ¡ ¿ )x; it is useful to rewrite this condition as (1 ¡ ®) + (1 ¡°) + (¿°¡°) > (2 ¡ ¿ )4²: First, observe that this condition cannot be satis¯ed in the absence of cohort e®ects (i.e ® =°= 1). But as either cohort e®ects increases (i.e. ® or°decreases), the condition is more likely to be satis¯ed. One interpretation of this fact is that as cohort become more important, dynamic coordination becomes more important. A player then only wants to invest if he believes that the other players invest at the same point in time. Second, if ¿ < 1; then decreasing°is more likely to make this condition hold then decreasing ® by the same amount, re°ecting the fact that a¯rst-period decision maker discounts the second-period investment payo®s. Third, as the uncertainty ² increases, the conditions is less likely to hold. As ² increases the uncertainty about the fundamental becomes more important relative to the coordination aspect. As the coordination aspect becomes less important, multiple equilibria are less likely to exists.
The following Lemma rules out the existence of other symmetric switching equilibria in various of the economic environments discussed in Section 3. (¿°¡ ®) ¡ ²(1 ¡ ¿ ) < ¢ then there exists no equilibrium in the class of symmetric switching equilibria in which k 2 < k 1 ¡ ² < 1:
: Also, note that since k 2 < k 1 ¡ ²; a player with signal s i 1 = k 1 who waits will invest in the second period for certain. Using these facts and Lemma (3) to rewrite equilibrium conditions (4) and (5) gives:
Observe that any player with a signal s i 2 < k 2 does not invest in either period because in this case s
and thus E(°n 1 + n 2 j s
: Using this fact and equation (8), we conclude that k 2¸1 2 + ¢: Rewriting equation (7) shows that
First, suppose that ®¸¿: In this case
and since k 2¸1 2 + ¢ a necessary condition for k 1 > k 2 + ² is that
This is equivalent to 0¸¢ + ²(1 ¡ ¿ ) + ¿ 2
(1 ¡°); a contradiction.
We are left to consider the case in which ® < ¿: Observe that since E(n 1 j s
and n 1 + n 2 · 1; E(n 2 j s
: Hence,
Thus, a necessary condition for k 1 > k 2 + ² is that
Rewriting this condition establishes the Lemma. Q.E.D.
The Lemma gives parameter restrictions that rule out a symmetric switching equilibrium in which players wait in order to invest in the second period with certainty. This type of behavior rules out any informational reason for waiting. Rather waiting must be driven by the desire to coordinate the timing of the investment. This can only be pro¯table if there are cohort e®ects and if, as discussed above, the second-period cohort e®ect is su±ciently less than the¯rst-period cohort e®ect (i.e.°> ®).
We are left to prove that there exists a unique equilibrium in the absence of cohort e®ects. We¯rst observe that this is true within the class of symmetric switching strategies.
Proposition 4 Suppose there are no cohort e®ects (i.e. ® =°= 1) and positive waiting costs (i.e. either ¿ < 1 or ¢ > 0). Then there exists a unique equilibrium in symmetric switching strategies.
Proof: Rewriting conditions (a), (b) and (c) from Proposition (3) yields:
Hence, there exists an informative waiting equilibrium (k 11 ; k 21 ) if 0 · ¢ · 1 4 + ². Note also that, when ® =°= 1, the other informative waiting equilibrium (k 12 ; k 22 ) cannot exist because condition (d) can be rewritten as 1 > (2¡¿ )(1+4²); which contradicts the fact that ¿ · 1 and ² > 0. Finally, observe that, when ® =°= 1, the condition stated in Lemma (1) can be written as ¡(1¡¿ )(
This condition is always satis¯ed unless ¿ = 1 and ¢ = 0. From Proposition (1), it follows that an immediate investment equilibrium exists if and only if ¢¸1 4 + ². Furthermore, as h() is strictly increasing for ® =°= 1; the immediate investment equilibrium is unique. Q.E.D.
In Appendix 3, we extend this result to show that there exists a unique equilibrium in rationalizable strategies in the absence of cohort e®ects.
Proposition 5 Suppose there are no cohort e®ects (i.e. ® =°= 1) and positive waiting costs (i.e. either ¿ < 1 or ¢ > 0). Then the symmetric switching equilibrium strategy is the (essentially) unique rationalizable equilibrium.
Summary and Discussion
In this paper, we analyzed the impact of strategic waiting in a global game. In contrast to its static counterpart, we found that the nature of the network e®ect is important. In particular, allowing for cohort e®ects can reintroduce multiple equilibria in environments in which the static game has a unique equilibrium. Furthermore, we argued that this¯nding is important because cohort e®ects arise naturally in many dynamic coordination problems. Table 1 presents parameter conditions under which an immediate investment equilibrium, a complete waiting equilibrium, and an informative waiting equilibrium exist in various economic environments encompassed by our model. In the absence of cohort e®ects, our game has a unique equilibrium (neglecting the knife edge case in which their are no waiting costs and investors with a su±ciently high signal are indi®erent between investing early and waiting in order to invest late). The PIEMA model is an interpretation of our model in which there are no cohort e®ects, and thus in the PIEMA environment there always exists a unique equilibrium.
Perhaps more surprisingly, in the FHTAP interpretation our model has a unique equilibrium in the class o symmetric switching strategies even though this interpretation allows for an early mover cohort e®ect. In this economic environment, however, the second period intra-and inter-period network e®ects are equal to each other. Furthermore, the¯rst period intra-period network e®ect is simply the discounted second-period network e®ect. In this environment, therefore, the bene¯ts of waiting and investing in the second period depend only on the total mass of investors and not on when the other players invest. Similarly, the bene¯ts of investing in the second period depend only on the total mass of investors and not on the timing of the other players' investments. Intuitively, therefore, the dynamic coordination is not severe enough for multiple equilibria to arise.
The ATFL interpretation, in contrast, allows for both a¯rst-and a second-period cohort e®ect. The dynamic coordination aspect thus becomes more important and our model has multiple equilibria in such an environment. This result carries over to the TAPPCT environment because it is very°exible and one can reproduce the parameter of the ATFL interpretation. In summary, the nature of the cohort e®ects determines whether our dynamic global game has multiple equilibria. These multiple equilibria did arise even though we used a Laplacian prior, abstracted from social learning, and restricted attention to the class of symmetric switching strategies.
Appendix 1
We¯rst prove the following lemma:
Lemma 2 8k 2 2 (k 1 ¡ ²; k 1 + ²), one has:
and,
Proof: To compute n 1 (¢) and n 2 (¢) we will work with the following graph (or with variants thereof):
[Insert here Graph 1]
In the above graph,the two \thick" black lines represent all the possible realizations that (² e denotes the point in which the diagonal k 1 ¡ µ cuts the upper thick black line. What are the coordinates of point e? We know that all points on the diagonal satisfy the restriction that their x and y coordinates sum up to k 1 ¡ µ. We also know that in point e the y coordinate equals +². Therefore the coordinates of point e are (k 1 ¡ µ ¡ ²; ²). If k 1 = µ, then the diagonal goes through the points b and c (this is logical: in both points k 1 ¡ µ = µ ¡ µ = 0 = ² ¡ ²). If k 1 = µ ¡ 2², then the diagonal goes through the point a. This is because in the point a, k 1 ¡ µ = ¡2² = ¡² ¡ ². Similarly, if k 1 = µ +2², then the diagonal goes through the point d. By continuity, if µ ¡ 2² < k 1 < µ, the diagonal k 1 ¡ µ cuts the thick line situated on the X-axis. Similarly, if µ < k 1 < µ + 2², the diagonal cuts the upper thick line.
The vertical "k 2 ¡ µ" permits us to compute the mass of players who invest at time two. For example, in graph three all players situated on the X-axis and to the right of "k 2 ¡ µ" invest at time two. This is easy to see: a player having received an ² When doesn't the vertical k 2 ¡ µ cross the lower thick line? k 2 ¡ µ > ² if and only if k 2 ¡ ² > µ. This is intuitive: if µ is \low", then no player who received \good news" will invest at time two. In that case point f lies to the right of point b. Similarly, k 2 ¡ µ < ¡² if and only if k 2 + ² < µ. In hat case point f lies to the left of point a.
We are focusing on an equilibrium in which k 1 ¡ ² < k 2 < k 1 + ². This implies that:
Therefore we must consider the following six cases:
In case (i) we know that µ < k 1 ¡ 2² < k 2 ¡ ². From above, we know that this implies that points e and f lie to the right of (respectively) d and b. Hence,
In case (ii) we know that point f lies to the right of point b, implying that -due to a low µ -n 2 (k 1 2² < µ < k 2 ²; k) = 0. Moreover we also know that in this case µ < k 1 which implies that the diagonal k 1 ¡ µ cuts the upper thick line. This case is represented in graph 2.
[Insert here Graph 2] In this case all players situated between points e and d invest at time one. Hence, it is straightforward to compute that
In case (iii) µ is still strictly lower than k 1 but the vertical k 2 ¡ µ crosses the two thick black lines. This case is represented in graph 1. The coordinates of e are (k 1 ¡µ ¡²; ²) and the ones of point f 0 are (k 2 ¡µ; ²). We are focussing on an equilibrium in which k 2 > k 1 ¡². This last inequality can be rewritten as k 2 ¡µ > k 1 ¡µ¡² which amounts to stating that point f 0 always lies to the right of point e. From above we thus know that n 1 (k 2 ¡ ² < µ < k 1 ; k) = . All players lying between [f; b] invest at time two. Hence, n 2 (k 2 ¡ ² < µ < k 1 ; k) = ²¡k 2 +µ 4²
:
In case (iv), µ is higher than k 1 . This implies that the diagonal "k 1 ¡ µ" cuts the lower thick line. Therefore all players who received an ² [Insert here Graph 3]
From above we know that the coordinates of point e are (k 1 ¡ µ + ²; ¡²). The coordinates of point f are (k 2 ¡ µ; ¡²). Note that k 2 ¡ µ < k 1 ¡ µ + ² if and only if k 2 < k 1 + ². As we work here under the assumption that k 2 < k 1 + ², it follows that point f lies to the left of point e. From the graph it should be clear that
and that n 2 (k 1 < µ < k 2 + ²; k) =
In case (v) point f lies to the left of point a. From above it should be clear that
, and that n 2 (k 2 +² < µ < k 1 +2²; k) =
.
In case (vi) point e (see graph 3) lies to the left of point a. Therefore n 1 (k 1 + 2² < µ; k) = 1 and n 2 (k 1 + 2² < µ; k) = 0. Q.E.D.
Appendix 2
Lemma 3 E(n j js
Proof: Trivially, one has
Q.E.D.
Lemma 4 For any k that solves equations (4) and (5) and for which k 2 2 (k 1 ¡ ²; k 1 + ²); one has h(s
Proof: Since
Leibnitz's rule implies that
We have shown in Appendix 1 that n 1 (¢) is weakly increasing in µ and therefore a su±cient condition for h(¢) to be strictly increasing is that
By Appendix 1, n 2 (¢) is weakly increasing in µ for all µ · k 2 + ² and hence h(s (4) and (5), h(k 2 ; k) = 0 and we conclude that h(s
As s i 2 > k 2 ; the¯rst term is positive. Since, by Appendix 1, n 1 (µ; k) is weakly increasing in µ; Leibnitz's rule implies that E(n 1 j s i 2 ; k) is weakly increasing in s
To prove that condition (9) is satis¯ed, we establish below that (i) E(n 2 j s
and thus
Using the facts that k 2 + ² < s i 2 + ² < k 1 + 2²; k 2 ¡ ² < s i 2 ¡ ² < k 1 and Appendix 1, it is easy to check that
We are left to show that E(n 2 j s
Integrating this last expression shows that E(n 2 j s Proof: The proof of this lemma proceeds by induction. We start with the following two remarks. Remark 1 follows from the fact that a player who invest at time two irrespective of her¯rst-period error term, strictly gains by investing at time one and saving the waiting cost. Remark 2 follows immediately from the fact that E(nj¢) is weakly increasing in s i 2 . On the basis of both remarks, we know that g(s 1 1 ; (1; 1)) must be equal to one (and only one) of the following two possibilities:
Both (10) and (11) take into account the fact that E(nj¢; (1; 1)) = 0. Equation (10) (² ¡ ¢) < 1. Equation (11) . We know that:
On the basis of Remark 1 and Remark 2, we can conclude that one (and only one) of the following two cases must prevail:
We now show that in case (i) s 8 Equation (11) implicitly relies on the assumption that s
Similarly, one can check that equation (10) is valid when ² > ¢.
Both inequalities above follow from the fact that the gain of investing cannot decrease when the other players are more eager to invest. But then it follows that g(s 
+E(njs
In subcase (a) it trivially follows that inequality (12) is satis¯ed. In subcase (b) inequality (12) can be rewritten as
which is obviously satis¯ed (E(nj¢) cannot decrease when players become more eager to invest).
We now show that inequality (12) also holds in case (ii). In case (ii), g(s 
In subcase (a') inequality (12) is trivially satis¯ed. In subcase (b'), inequality (12) can be rewritten as
Note that the rhs of this last inequality is decreasing in ¿ . Setting ¿ = 1, we can rewrite this last inequality as:
Note that the rhs of the inequality above is increasing in ¢. In case (ii), h(s Substituting ¢ in (13) by its minimal value given in (14) and after rearranging terms, we can rewrite equation (12) as
Above we have already shown that this inequality holds. In subcase (c') inequality (12) boils down to
which is obviously satis¯ed. As g(s Proof: The proof of this lemma mirrors the one we outlined in Lemma (5). On the basis of Remark 1 and Remark 2, we know that g(s 1 1 ; (¡1; ¡1)) must be equal to one of the following two possibilities:
Both (15) and (16) . On the basis of Remark 1, Remark 2, and continuity of g(); we know that one (and only one) of the following two cases must prevail:
We¯rst tackle the case where the expression for g(s 
Case (i) implicitly relies on the assumption that
Subcase (a) relies on the assumption that
As (s (E(nj¢) cannot increase when players become less eager to invest). But this implies that (18) 
))
Note that the lhs is decreasing in ¿ and increasing in ¢. In subcase (c) we know that s Setting ¿ = 1 and replacing ¢ by its minimal value given in our last inequality yields E(njs which is obviously satis¯ed.
Using a reasoning similar to the one we outlined in subcase (i)(a), the reader can check that in case (ii), (a) and (b) are no valid expressions for g(s is non increasing, << (1; 1) 8n > 1, and bounded from below by the Nash equilibrium (which must survive iterative elimination of dominated strategies). Similarly, from Lemma (6), we know that the sequence (s n 1 ; s n 2 ) is non decreasing, >> (¡1; ¡1) 8n > 1, and bounded from above by the Nash equilibrium. Hence, both sequences converges to some limit (k 1 ; k 2 ); which satis¯es g(k 1 ; (k 1 ; k 2 )) = 0; h(k 2 ; (k 1 ; k 2 )) = 0:
Thus, both sequences converges to the unique symmetric switching equilibrium strategy pro¯le. Q.E.D. Note that g(¢) = minfl 1 (¢); l 2 (¢); l 3 (¢); l 4 (¢)g.
Lemma 7
For any k that solves equations (4) and (5) and for which k 2 2 (k 1 ¡ ²; k 1 + ²); one has g(s 
which is positive for°; ¿ · 1 and k 2 < k 1 + ². Note also that 
Observe that To show that g(¢) < 0 8s i 1 < k 2 ¡ ², it is useful to note that:
Lemma 8 For any k that solves equations (4) and (5) and for which k 2 2 (k 1 ¡ ²; k 1 + ²); one has E(n 1 js i 1 ; k) + ®E(n 2 js i 1 ; k) is weakly increasing in s i 1 .
Proof: Using Appendix 1, it is easy to verify that n 1 (µ; k) + n 2 (µ; k) is (weakly) increasing in µ. Suppose that n 1 (¢) + ®n 2 (¢) is strictly decreasing in µ for some µ. This requires that 0 < @n 1 (¢) @µ < ¡® @n 2 (¢) @µ . Since ® · 1, this implies thus that @n 1 (¢) @µ < ¡ @n 2 (¢) @µ and thus that n 1 (¢) + n 2 (¢) decreases in µ, a contradiction. We conclude that n 1 (¢) + n 2 (¢) is weakly increasing in µ. Because E(n 1 + ®n 2 js [n 1 (µ; k) + ®n 2 (µ; k)]dµ;
